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Abstract. Security properties are essential in open and distributed en-
vironments with high dependability requirements. An approach to de-
velopment and analysis of safety- and security-critical systems based on
renement as the central concept can oer an integrated solution. We
analyse the Online Certicate Status Protocol (OCSP), showing how to
use renement as an interference analysis tool for secure communication
protocols and intruders.
1 Motivation
Dependable systems require a high level of safety and security. Security is be-
coming increasingly important since more and more systems are deployed in
open distributed and networked environments, and are therefore subject to ex-
ternal threads. Security is concerned with aspects such as condentiality { the
prevention of disclosure of information to unauthorised users {, integrity { the
prevention of unauthorised modication of information {, and authentication {
the proven establishment of the identity of another agent in a distributed system.
Several methods have been suggested for the development and analysis of
protocols in distributed and networked systems [1, 2, 3, 4]. We present an in-
tegrated framework based on renement as the key concept for development
and analysis. We use the Online Certicate Status Protocol (OCSP) as our case
study. OCSP [5] is an information acquisition protocol used in public key infras-
tructures (PKI), i.e., systems that manage cryptographic keys in security-critical
environments. Its main purpose is to check the revocation status of a certicate
(the key concept to guarantee authentication in networked systems).
2 The Notation
The Command Language. A protocol consists of several communicating agents.
Each of these agents has the capacity to perform a set of basic actions, such as
sending or receiving messages:
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names that will be substituted by the actual message elements.
All identiers, such as the messages, are names. The basic actions can be com-
bined by a set of classical combinators: sequential composition a
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, non-
deterministic choice a
1
+a
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, parallel composition a
1
ja
2
, and iteration a

. A pro-
tocol is usually described as a parallel composition of agents. Agents composed
in parallel can interact if a send and a receive operation match { determined by
matching sender/receiver IDs and the length of the message list.
OCSP is a request/response protocol. It provides a generic message envelope
for a variety of services. A set of standardised request/response-types exist. One
of these is ORS (Online Revocation Status) providing information about the
revocation status of a certicate. Requests contain the elements service ID, a
certicate (the certicate to be checked), and an optional signature (the client
signs the message). The response contains a response status (successful, mal-
FormedRequest, etc.), a certicate status (good, revoked, unknown), and an
optional signature (the server signs the message). A protocol P between client
C and server S is dened as the parallel composition P  CjS with:
C := snd
C
(S; serv; cert; sig); rcv
C
(S; respStat; certStat; sig)
S := rcv
S
(C; serv; cert; sig); snd
S
(C; respStat; certStat; sig)
The Specication Language. The command language is embedded into a speci-
cation language based on modal logic [6] { a logic with a notion of state suitable
for the description of reactive systems. We derive our variant from the modal -
calculus [7] { a branching time temporal logic. Actions are explicit in this logic.
Besides the usual logical combinators, two modal combinators are provided:
{ [a] is based on the box- or always operator, describing that if a terminates
it does so in a state satisfying .
{ hai is based on the diamond- or eventually operator, describing that a can
terminate in a state satisfying .
The syntax for formulas is  ::= truejfalsejj
1
^
2
j
1
^
2
j : : : j[a]jhai where
 2 P is a predicate. Names can be compared for equality. Additionally, a set
of security predicates are provided:
{ The predicate Knows
A
(X) describes that an agent A 'knows' about an item
X , i.e., A has access to X either by creating it or by having received it.
{ The predicate unMod
A
(X) is true if A has received an item X that has not
been modied during transmission, i.e., is unmodied.
{ Auth
A
(B) expresses that an agent A has authenticated another agent B.
A formula  ! [a]  or  ! hai  with precondition  and postcondition  
shall be called a contract for a.
The semantic structures in which this logic is interpreted are Kripke transi-
tion systems { a combination of Kripke structures and labelled transition systems
[6, 8]. A Kripke transition system (KTS) is a quadrupleM = (S;Act;!; I) with
2
a set of states S, a set of actions Act, a transition relation!  SActS, and
an interpretation I . The structureM shall be dened over a set of predicates P .
The elements in the sets Act and P shall be indexed by agents.
We interpret closed formulas  as subsets of S whose states make  true.
We dene [[true]]

:= S and [[false]]

:= ;; standard logical combinators are
dened as usual. Predicates  2 P are dened via environments  : P ! PS,
i.e. [[]]

:= ().
[[[a]]]

:= fs j for all t holds (s; a; t) 2!g
[[hai]]

:= fs j exists t such that (s; a; t) 2!g
We use this language to specify security properties. Server S needs to au-
thenticate client C { we assume additional signing and verifying actions.
[rcv
S
(C; serv; cert; sig)] Knows
S
(K
pub
C
)! vrf
S
(K
pub
C
; sig)
S validates C's signature sig using C's public key. This shall be abbreviated
by the predicate Auth
S
(C). The OCSP denition states a success criterion: the
client needs to accept a server response only if C authenticates S and S replies
with respect to the request certicate.
[snd
C
(S; serv; cert); rcv
C
(S; rStat; cert
0
; cStat)] cert = cert
0
^ Auth
C
(S)
Other properties could be specied, e.g. an explicit exclusion of a replay attack,
or properties related to the availability of data.
3 Interference Analysis using Renement
We dene a renement relation for actions based on the notion of contracts. Let
C
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This follows classical denitions [9, 10] { here in a dierent semantical framework.
A central idea of our approach to security analysis of protocols is explicit
intruder modelling. The intruder is added to the protocol specication through
renement. The original protocol specication P is the ideal protocol. It states
expected security properties. In a renement P v P jI the intruder I is added
using parallel composition P jI . Either these properties are preserved or are vi-
olated. In the latter case, we have found a security aw. In the former case,
P v P jI holds, i.e., the intruder cannot interfere with the protocol. The proto-
col can be analysed by systematically varying the intruder behaviour. We look
at dierent security aspects separately.
Theorem 1. Renements AjB v AjBjI are guaranteed if the constraints given
by the renement laws { see Figure 1 { are satised.
1
Additionally, we need to exclude some trivial cases such as C
a
2
 true! [a
2
] false,
which result in proper renements, but would also constitute a security problem.
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Condentiality AjB v AjBjI if Conf(AjBjI)! Conf(AjB) with
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Integrity AjB v AjBjI if Int(AjBjI)! Int(AjB) with
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Authentication AjB v AjBjI if Authenticate(AjBjI)! Authenticate(AjB) with
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Fig. 1. Renement Laws for Security Properties
We need axiomatisations { called laws { for the basic actions. Condentiality
laws shall be addressed rst. An agent knows about an item by either creating
it or receiving it. The agent remembers it after executing an action.
Knows
A
(X)! [snd
A
(B;X)] Knows
A
(X)
The interaction between agents is dened in terms of the Knows-predicate:
Knows
A
(M)! [snd
A
(B;M)jrcv
B
(A; x)] Knows
B
(M)
which is our denition of the reaction between two agents. The message M
replaces the input variable x for agent B.
An integrity law is [snd
A
(B;M)jrcv
B
(A; x)jI ]Knows
B
(M)! unMod
B
(M).
Authentication laws can also be formulated.
4 Protocol Analysis
Intruder models such as the Dolev-Yao model assign certain capabilities to an in-
truder. With a reduced set of actions, we could assume that the intruder capabil-
ity is to non-deterministically iterate receive- and send-actions, i.e., (rcv
I
(X;M)+
snd
I
(Y;N))

. Varying the intruder behaviour allows us to analyse dierent forms
of attacks. An example is the man-in-the-middle attack. If a client does not sign
a message, the intruder I can act as the client and communicate with the server:
snd
I
(S; serv; cert)
After this :Auth
S
(C) holds, which violates the authentication property:
[rcv
S
(C; serv; cert)] Auth
S
(C)
Our analysis tool is renement, i.e., we need to check whether CjS v CjSjI
holds. We get CjS 6v CjSjI since the authentication Auth
S
(C) was required.
Signatures should be used, which would also help us to guarantee integrity.
4
Another attack type is the replay attack: the intruder I plays the role of the
server and replays previously sent messages to the current client:
rcv
I
(S;M); rcv
I
(C;M
0
); snd
I
(C;M)
assuming thatM andM
0
are messages about the same certicate. This behaviour
again matches the general intruder capacity. The remedy is to include nonces {
randomly created values { which is not required by the OCSP denition.
The aws that can be detected with our approach have been described in the
literature. However, a formal account does not exist.
5 Concluding Remarks
An important aspect is tool support for this form of analysis. We have based our
semantic framework on the modal -calculus [7] to be able to consider model
checking [8]. A model, i.e., a Kripke transition system, M = (S;Act;!; I) over
a set of predicates P can be constructed for a particular purpose, e.g. the con-
dentiality analysis. Another direction that could be pursued is testing. Aichernig
[11] addresses test case generation based on renement and abstraction.
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